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Introduction
The trade in fresh vegetables between Kenya and the United Kingdom has grown rapidly in the past two decades. This growth was accompanied by drastic restructuring. Loose trading relationships in wholesale markets were replaced by tightly-structured supply chains. Certain aspects of this transformation, such as the development of year-round supply of fresh produce, expansion of product ranges and development of sophisticated "cool chains" are similar to those described by Friedland (1994) . However, the Kenya-UK fresh vegetables trade is not dominated by transnational companies of the type described by Friedland. Rather, it is based on networks of Kenya-based producer-exporters, medium-sized UK importers and large UK retailers. The best way to understand how these networks have developed and how they continue to change is not to look to the literature on transnational corporations, but rather to the literature on global value chains.
Global value chain analysis emerged initially out of a recognition of the role of global buyers in creating global production and marketing networks. It has become an analytical approach which explains why different types of global production and distribution networks arise and how the activities of firms or production units are co-ordinated explicitly through the integration of operational decisions about what is to be produced, how and when.
1 This paper analyses the Kenya-UK fresh vegetables trade from a global value chain perspective. It presents the concept of governance in value chains and then explains why the horticulture trade has changed and the consequences of this change for the structure of horticultural production and processing in Africa. 2 It then considers the possible outcomes of two current trends in the UK horticulture industry: the shift from company to generic standards and the introduction of category management by UK supermarkets.
Governance in global value chains
Global value chain analysis emerged initially out of a recognition of the role of global buyers in creating global production and marketing networks. Gereffi (1994) Therefore, it is essential to understand why particular types of value chain governance arise.
In any production system, there are two key decisions:
1. What is to be produced. What characteristics will the product have?
2. How it is to be produced. This involves the definition of production processes, which can include elements such as the technology to be used, quality systems, labour standards and environmental standards.
One way of organising a value chain would be for these parameters to be determined by each agent at each point in the chain. Thee co-ordination of the activities of the different agents would be achieved through arm's length market relationships. Agents in the market make decisions about what to produce, buy and sell. What is to be produced is determined by the producer in accordance with their understanding of the requirements of potential customers. Therefore, buyers are "design takers", purchasing ready-made products. This requires that there is "sufficient stability of products and manufacturing practices so that both sellers and buyers can plan their activities rationally and make rational decisions to sell and 4 buy at the prices at which the markets equilibrate" (Simon, 2000: 750) . The producer also decides how products are to be produced. The buyer is indifferent to this choice except insofar as it results in product characteristics that affect the value of the product for the buyer.
Co-ordination through markets can be facilitated by intermediaries, who transmit information about buyers' wants to producers and information about what producers are making to sellers (Spulber, 1996) .
This co-ordination breaks down when markets are fast-moving, or when buyers are concerned with product characteristics which cannot easily be assessed at the time of purchase. However, there are a variety of ways in which buyers can transmit their own requirements to producers or obtain more information about both product and process characteristics, while still maintaining an ability to switch easily between suppliers:
• Products can be customised to meet buyers' specifications. As long as this does not require transaction-specific investments by either party, it can be managed through market relationships. In this case, the buyer chooses from a supplier-defined set of options. Buyer specification of product parameters can go further. For example, it used to be common for firms in the US auto industry to provide detailed design drawings for suppliers to make components (Helper, 1993) . The products were made using generic machinery, and so no transaction-specific assets were involved on either side. This allowed the auto companies to draw upon a wide range of potential suppliers, choosing between them predominantly on the basis of cost.
• Product grading allows the classification of products into different groups according to the measurement of specified characteristics. 4 Once again, this allows the buyer to choose between different product categories, which might be defined by governments, industry associations or leading firms.
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• Product characteristics can be established through product labelling which specifies that they meet certain characteristics. This is particularly important with regard to safety, as would be the case for the labelling of children's toys or electrical equipment.
• Information about processes along the chain can be provided through certification.
Generic standards such as ISO 9000 (quality systems), ISO 14000 (environmental protection procedures) and SA 8000 (social standards), and sectoral standards such as Eurepgap 5 give buyers some indication about suppliers' adherence to particular norms.
Process standards respond to two different requirements. Firstly, they can be a more effective way of controlling product characteristics than inspection of the finished product. The development of total quality management has driven a shift from control over product to control over process as a means of achieving quality. The introduction of process controls such as HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point)
analysis can be seen in the same light. Secondly, an increasing demand in global markets for process controls arising from concerns about safety, labour and environmental standards creates " credence goods", which in the context of agricultural produce have been described as follows: "A credence good is a complex, new product with quality and/or safety aspects that cannot be known to consumers through sensory inspection or observation-in-consumption... The quality and safety characteristics that constitute credence attributes include the following: (1) food safety; (2) healthier, more nutritional foods (low-fat, low-salt, etc.); (3) authenticity; (4) production processes that promote a safe environment and sustainable agriculture; (5) "fair trade" attributes (e.g., These mechanisms are important for ordering markets. They communicate information about product and process parameters between buyers and sellers and provide buyers with assurances about what they are buying.
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Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that in some situations buyers will choose to specify product and process parameters through explicit co-ordination along the value chain.
Buyer specification of product parameters arises in two circumstances. Firstly, it is required when buyers require a high level of customised inputs. This is particularly likely to arise when manufacturers make products with integral product architecture. As the design of the product changes, the components also have to be redesigned. Secondly, it arises when the buyer has a better understanding of the demands of the market than the supplier. The buyer then interprets the needs of the market and informs the supplier of what is required.
Buyer specification of process parameters arises, firstly, when buyers may not find any suitable standard available for regulating particular process parameters. Secondly, buyers may not regard generic standards as sufficiently credible. Thirdly, buyers may deliberately create their own standards as a form of product differentiation. 7 If buyers create private process standards, it follows that they must not only incur the costs of developing and operationalising the standard, but that the value chain must incur the cost of arranging for standards to be enforced through monitoring procedures. The benefits from increased product characteristics or more reliable adherence with product or process standards must be enough to outweigh these costs.
The specification of product and process parameters can also lead to increased specification of logistics parameters along the chain. This usually occurs when there is a degree of task complexity and/or time pressure that requires co-ordination of tasks across firms. This is frequently an issue in the perishables sector, and the setting of product and process parameters reinforces it, because the number of potential suppliers is restricted and products cannot be bought from independent intermediaries.
Parameters setting can occur in many value chain relationships. Global value chain analysis suggests that the introduction of developing country suppliers into value chains 7 creates particular needs for parameter specification. When developing country suppliers are integrated into global value chains they are exposed to the demands of more sophisticated markets. As Hobday has argued, the 'latecomer' firm to the global economy is "dislocated from the mainstream international markets it wishes to supply" (Hobday, 1995: 34).
Frequently, the standards and regulations for these markets are quite distinct from those in the domestic market, and increasing concern with consumer safety and ethical trade in (2000) argue that two distinct types of governance should be distinguished within networks when parameters setting is being considered. On the one hand, there are networks that bring together firms with complementary competences. These jointly set parameters. They refer to these as "networks", as the term network is frequently used to denote some form of co-operation between "equals". On the other hand, there are networks characterised by a marked asymmetry of competence and power between the lead firm and subordinate firms within the chain. The lead firm often specifies what is to be produced, how it is to be produced and how the performance of firms in the chain is to be monitored.
Humphrey and Schmitz refer to this form of governance as "quasi-hierarchy".
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The development of closer relationships with fewer suppliers creates the problems of transactional dependency and opportunism. While these problems may be ameliorated through persistent relationships that involve repeat transactions and the development of trust between the partners, it is important to recognise that tensions and conflicts exist even in long-term relationships. Transactions cost analysis points to the ways in which these can be managed. Four particular costs are associated with working with a small number of suppliers: 9 1. Co-ordination costs -the cost of transmitting information between agents in the chain and the delays arising from such co-ordination.
2. Operations risk. One of the partners may under-perform, failing to meet all of its commitments. As relationships become more complex, this becomes more difficult to monitor.
3. Vulnerability to opportunism arising from transaction-specific investments. These increase the cost of switching between suppliers or buyers, so that bargaining power is reduced compared to the situation prior to making the investments.
4. Loss of resource control: "Resources may be generated or transferred as the result of a relationship that is difficult to control after the fact" (Clemons et al., 1993: 16) .
Technology or expertise may leak from a "partner" to suppliers or buyers.
These costs are not necessarily an obstacle to the development of closer relationships with fewer suppliers. However, they are a factor in relationships. The firms in such relationships have to find ways of managing them.
This section has defined what is meant by the value chain governance, specifying the reasons why firms might wish to specify parameters along the chain, distinguishing between different governance structures and considering the costs associated with such governance.
These concepts will now be applied to explain the evolution of value chains in the UK fresh 9 produce industry. The reasons why the value chain linking UK supermarkets and their suppliers in Africa has evolved and why different forms of governance have emerged at different stages in the chain will be discussed.
The horticulture value chain: 1960s -1980s
In the late 1960s, wholesale markets traded 90% of fresh horticultural produce in the UK, linking dispersed producers with small retailers, greengrocers and market stalls (Gray and Kleih, 1997). When Kenya began selling "Asian" vegetables and off-season temperate vegetables in the UK during the early 1970s, these, too, were sold through wholesale markets.
These sales channels created relatively few barriers to entry for overseas producers and exporters. For example, Kenya's horticultural trade, which began with a small number of Asian-owned family enterprises during the 1960s, rapidly expanded to over 100 exporters by the mid-1980s (Jaffee, 1995: 353). While the top ten exporters accounted for the greater part of the business, there were many smaller firms supplying French beans and Asian vegetables to UK wholesale markets during the peak season of October to April. Some of the larger exporters had contracts with medium-sized farms, but the majority of exporters purchased vegetables through spot markets in rural areas (Harris, 1992; Dijkstra, 1997). The fact that many of these businesses operated for a short period of time and with limited capital, buying produce when margins were good and withdrawing when conditions were difficult, reinforces the point that barriers to entry were low.
Barriers to entry for producers were also low, and by the early 1980s the participation of smallholders in fresh vegetable production had increased markedly. Whereas the majority of 
The transformation of the fresh vegetables value chain: 1990s
The fresh vegetables trade continued to grow in the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1997, exports from sub-Saharan Africa to the EU grew by 151%. Kenya remained the dominant supplier, accounting for 56% of all vegetable exports from sub-Saharan Africa. 11 In this period, however, the fresh vegetables value chain was totally transformed. This transformation stemmed from several factors. Firstly, UK multiple stores (supermarkets and major retail chains) greatly increased their share of total fresh fruit and vegetables sales, from 44% in 1992 to 76% in 1997, the highest level in the EU (Nagarajan et al., 1994). Secondly, the supermarkets by-passed the wholesale markets and worked directly with UK importers, delegating lower-profit functions such as quality control, monitoring, and distribution to their suppliers (Marsden and Wrigley, 1996). Thirdly, there was a marked shift away from standardised, loose product to greater product variety, product innovation and increased packaging and processing. Fourthly, traceability was established along the chain, and monitoring and audit regimes put in place.
What drove these changes? And what were the consequences of these changes on the structure of the value chain, the distribution of functions within it, and the inclusion and exclusion of different agents?
Transforming the outputs of the chain
The two main factors driving the restructuring of the fresh vegetables value chain and the increasing role of supermarkets in explicit co-ordination of the chain were, firstly, the competitive strategies of the supermarkets around product differentiation, and secondly, the need to control risk in the face of a more complex regulatory and consumer environment.
For UK supermarkets, fresh produce was a key item in competition for market share in the 1990s. It was not only profitable (it had one of the highest returns per square metre of shelf space, rivalled only by wine and chilled food), but it was also a "destination category" -one of the few products that that influence a consumer's choice of stores. In the 15 years up to the late 1990s, supermarkets doubled the shelf area of fresh produce departments in an effort to strengthen their image as suppliers of quality products (Burch and Goss, 1999) .
They extended the range of imported produce on offer by introducing new vegetables, more sophisticated packaging and increased levels of post-harvest processing such as washing, trimming and chopping. A visit to any major supermarket chain in the UK reveals innovation in product range (particularly in exotic and tropical fruit and vegetables), product variety (vine-ripened tomatoes, for example, and increasing ranges of organic produce), food preparation (pre-washed and chopped food), packaging (including joint packaging of complementary foods, such as sweet corn and sugar snap peas ready for stir-fry dishes), and the introduction of new produce to the mass market (for example, through new recipe ideas).
These products had to be supplied consistently over the year, even if this meant sourcing produce from different countries around the world, in order to prevent shoppers from switching to rival stores. In other words, the value chain was not only expected to supply a physical product, but also range of services associated with it such as consistency, reliability of delivery and the capacity to innovate.
These trends also reflected increasing consumer concerns with health and a greater willingness to cook and eat "ethnic" foods. However, the supermarkets were not merely following consumer preferences. They were interpreting these preferences and translating them into particular products, as well as playing an active role in creating the supply chains required to produce them. The supermarkets took the lead in deciding which new products would be brought to market and how inputs and knowledge from various sources would be mobilised for use in the value chain.
12 13 UK supermarkets increasingly specified the process parameters to be followed along the value chain. In part, this was a consequence of the drive to improve product quality. Quality, for example, was obtained through greater emphasis on how products were grown and harvested, and the conditions and speed under which they were transported and stored.
Product differentiation itself, and in particular the introduction of ready-to-eat vegetables, required conformance with EU laws on food preparation, necessitating strict process controls during processing and packing. Much of this work was carried out in Kenya.
Nevertheless, the critical driver for increased process control was the increasingly demanding regulatory environment. In 1990 the UK government established comprehensive standards for food hygiene and safety in the Food Safety Act. 13 The Act required that retailers demonstrate "due diligence" in the manufacture, transportation, storage and preparation of food (Marsden and Wrigley, 1996), holding them accountable for lapses in their suppliers' performance. Similarly, in 1993 the EU introduced a programme to harmonise maximum pesticide residue levels (MRLs) on food sold in the EU, authorising governments to 'name and shame' retailers selling products with residues that exceeded the legal standards (Chan and King, 2000) .
These regulations were part of a broader trend towards the increasing salience of credence factors among consumers who were not only concerned about quality and safety, but also about the social and environmental conditions under which products were produced (Reardon 14 food safety) to include such factors as working conditions (both in the fields and the packhouses), the use of child labour and the environmental aspects of agricultural production.
Logistics parameters were also specified. The UK supermarkets sought to organise the flow of products through the chain so that they were transported efficiently from farm to supermarket shelf. These specifications extended from systems for postharvest cooling and storage of produce on farm, to the conditions at packhouses and airport handling facilities, and finally to the processing and storage at the UK importers' own facilities. Further, the supermarkets, together with the importers and exporters, developed systems for planning crop production so that supplies of produce matched expected consumer demand.
Introducing and enforcing these parameters required much greater co-ordination of activities and increased information flows along the value chain. Product parameters were revised through discussions with importers and exporters, who had to translate product and packaging ideas into viable production and processing systems. Co-ordination of production schedules involved not only establishing annual supply programmes, but also involved weekly or daily contact along the chain so that decisions could be made about what crops to harvest, which product promotions to undertake, and what adjustments were required to meet unforeseen events. Process parameters were enforced by regular inspection and audit and the creation of quality systems that allowed for traceability and record-keeping and such questions as pesticide application. In some cases, the implementation of these systems became a competitive advantage when UK supermarkets introduced codes 15 of practice to cover the production processes of their supply chains (e.g. Nature's Choice developed by Tesco). By the mid-1990s all the major supermarkets had implemented company-specific codes and introduced detailed procedures for monitoring them.
It should be noted that while UK retailers were able to make considerable progress towards ensuring traceability and applying process controls, systems controls are sometimes breached.
There are some indications that UK supermarkets are willing to relax tight controls over the production base in circumstances of product shortfall, purchasing from intermediaries and other non-audited suppliers.
The changing structure and governance of the chain
The delivery of product innovation, quality, reliability and safety required a considerable restructuring of the fresh vegetables value chain. The supermarkets looked for greatly increased co-ordination and control, but had no intention of extending ownership. Therefore, it was necessary to construct a chain which allowed co-ordination, mobilised competences and provided an adequate incentive structure for those involved. This meant developing tighter relationships between UK-based retailers and importers, and Kenyan-based exporters and growers.
The relationships between actors in the chain became more complex and exclusive. The supermarkets worked directly with a limited number of UK importers. In some respects the relationships had the characteristics of obligational contracting (Sako, 1992). Relationships were long-term, but rarely formalised in contracts. There were also some elements of risk sharing. Supermarkets might agree to pay importers a fixed percentage of the final product price, which meant that both parties would gain or lose as prices rose or fell. The importers acquired new functions, moving beyond a "trading" role toward providing a broader range of services and assuming a more active role in the management of the value chain. As well as providing some UK-based processing and handling, they assumed responsibility for developing new sources of supply, supporting developing country producers and monitoring their performance. Their technical capabilities, in particular, became increasingly important, with importers often working in concert with exporters to solve production problems or to develop new products and presentation ideas. importers and supermarkets were generally long-term, but they were sometimes terminated, and the threat of termination could be used to drive down prices. Furthermore, the use of the multiple importers led to a loss of resource control. According to one leading UK importer, new product ideas had to be hidden from supermarket buyers, otherwise they would be passed on to competitors.
Relationships between UK importers and African exporters also changed in the 1990s. In order to develop and maintain product and process parameters, importers developed closer relationships with exporters. Generally speaking, each exporter would sell to only one UK importer, which would not source from more than one Kenyan exporter. This provided some degree of mutual dependence and ensured that neither importer nor exporter were competing with other firms for the same produce. However, the degree of transactional dependence between the parties was not the same. While four of the five largest Kenyan exporters were sending between 70 and 100 percent of their output to the UK, the importers were buying from various countries in order to maintain year-round supply and spread risk. 16 Nevertheless, there were long-term relationships between UK importers and Kenyan exporters, 17 and in some cases these were reinforced by equity and financial ties. The importers wanted to ensure continuity of supply and to guarantee a return on their investments in the capabilities of African exporters. The exporters were concerned about operations risk.
If the importer had various suppliers, would one supplier be preferred over another? This prompted two of Africa's largest exporters (one in Kenya) to establish their own UK importers, thus providing them with dedicated distribution channels in the UK.
The product and process parameters of UK supermarkets changed the roles of exporters and producers, forcing them to acquire a range of new capabilities to retain their UK business.
They could no longer act purely as growers or traders. Product and process innovations depended upon sophisticated technical knowledge of production, as well as close ties with researchers, seed companies, and importers. Increased processing, including production of ready to eat products, entailed heavy investments in cold storage, packhouses and high-care facilities, so that produce could be harvested, processed and transported to the UK in hygienically and temperature-controlled conditions (Hopwood, 2001). At the same time, the imperatives for rapid and reliable delivery placed pressure on African exporters to gain greater control over logistics by stabilising handling and transport costs. 18 These challenges provided the impetus for two of Kenya's largest exporters to secure joint ventures with freight forwarders, enabling them to control more closely the post harvest process and the efficient flow of produce through the chain.
By the end of the 1990s, the demands for capital and technical capacity had led to the exclusion of many small exporters who were unable to meet supermarket requirements. This exclusion was clearly evident in all the major African FFV exporting countries, but was particularly significant in Kenya, where the top seven firms controlled over 75% of all exports by the end of the 1990s. Those small and medium-size firms that remained in the trade were largely dependent on arms-length marketing relationships, exporting bulk produce to wholesale markets in Europe and the UK.
The restructuring of the chain also led to two changes in production. Firstly, production moved away from smallholders to large farms, many of which were owned by the exporters.
By 1998, four of the largest exporters in Kenya sourced only 18 percent of their total produce from smallholders. This partly stemmed from the perception of supermarkets that smallholders could not meet process controls, such as food safety and pesticide regulations, but also from exporters who were concerned about the costs entailed in monitoring large numbers of small farmers (Dolan et al., 1999: 29) . Those smallholders that remained in the value chain were organised into grower schemes with a high degree of supervision by the exporters. 19 Secondly, several large Kenyan exporters began to acquire their own growing capacity, with an increasing number centralising production on their own estates. According to one leading UK importer, a key factor in losing a supermarket contract was the fact that its main African supplier had no farms of its own (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).
New tendencies in the horticultural value chain: 2000 and beyond
Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the UK supermarkets had restructured the fresh vegetable value chain, moving away from their initial reliance on wholesale markets to tightly-knit supply chains. However, value chains and governance structures are dynamic, and two factors are further changing governance structures in the chain. Firstly, external standards and independent certification procedures are becoming more important for European retailers.
Secondly, the supermarkets are seeking to a further rationalise the value chain and outsource more of the management of the chain. To what extent will these tendencies reinforce or undermine existing governance structures in the chain?
The shift to external process standards
By the end of the 1990s the majority of UK supermarkets had developed their own company standards, not only defining the product and process parameters to be met along the value chain, but also establishing systems to monitor and control compliance. Within the last few years, however, the range of standards adopted by UK supermarkets has extended to include 19 several broad-based external standards that generally cover a range of firms and address several different areas of risk within the supply chain.
These later generations of standards address two sources of risk for the supermarkets. The first relates to consumer pressure. In contrast to company standards, external standards have been formulated by a wider range of actors including trade associations, NGOs, companies and the public sector. The multi-stakeholder nature of these standards provides supermarkets with greater legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of consumers, and has been a key factor behind their widespread adoption. The second source of risk is the costs involved in ensuring compliance, which can reduce supermarket competitiveness in an industry characterised by extremely tight margins. As Nadvi and Waltring (2001) note, if a buyer is exposed to process risks in the supply chain, it is in their interest to ensure that the costs entailed in mitigating those risks are also borne by its competitors. This is a strong motivation for supermarkets to implement standards that are broadly recognised in the market, for it reduces the "spillover" Thirdly, supermarkets may continue with company standards and their associated governance structures because branding and product differentiation are key to their competitive strategy. As increasing numbers of consumers make choices on the basis of social and environmental concerns, supermarkets recognise the benefits that codes of practice can provide in differentiating their products. This is particularly the case for supermarket-own codes (e.g. Tesco's Nature's Choice) which clearly distinguish them from their competitors.
Finally, logistics integration and product development remain important factors in value chain governance. Even if process parameters could be controlled effectively via generic standards, neither supermarkets nor importers would countenance a return to spot markets.
The demands for product innovation, product quality and reliability of delivery entail cooperation between exporters and importers in resolving unforeseen contingencies and providing solutions to technical problems. However, the way these are managed in the future will be influenced by a second significant change in the fresh vegetables chain, the introduction of category management.
Category management
The previous sections have described how the UK supermarkets have reduced the number of their fresh produce suppliers and extended the range of activities performed by them. A former employee of a large supermarket estimated that in 1987 it had 800 fresh produce 22 suppliers, compared to less than 80 by 2000. Category management takes this process a significant step further. Although implementations of category management vary between supermarkets, and each supermarket is still working out how to apply the system in different areas of its product range, the basic idea is simple. Products are grouped into a number of categories, and within each category the value chain is consolidated and a large part of its management transferred from the supermarkets to the "category captain" or "category manager".
The category captain is expected to play a much broader role in managing not only the supply chain but also the marketing side of its category. Category management involves a shift of functions from the supermarket to the category manager, taking over functions previously exercised by the supermarket, in particular:
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• Organising the supply chain. The category captain co-ordinates the supply chain, working with other suppliers to ensure consistent, year-round supply of produce. This involves anticipating demand and arranging supply, sequencing production from different areas.
Previously, the supermarket would have co-ordinated the different suppliers.
• Integrating the management of the whole value chain. One of the characteristics of category management is that the interface between the supermarket and the category manager is broadened to include specialists in logistics, packaging, quality, finance and product development.
• Developing the category. The category manager takes responsibility for developing the category's profile and maximising returns. This means taking over marketing activities, such as working with consumer focus groups, collecting data on sales trends, comparing like-for-like sales across the retail sector and analysing returns per square metre shelf space, and taking more responsibility for product innovation and managing the innovation process along the value chain.
• Information exchange. Category managers are expected to provide extensive information about costing margins along the chain, although this information does not flow equally in both directions
The category management model is being combined with a consolidation of the supply chain. Typically, the number of suppliers for each fresh produce category is being reduced from six or more to just three: the category manager and two other suppliers. The process of consolidation in the fresh produce sector is continuing, and a number of UK fresh produce importers report that they are being asked to focus on supplying each major customer with a small range of products in larger volumes.
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The fresh produce value chain will be consolidated around a much smaller group of larger importers with considerable technical and financial resources. Category management represents a clear shift from quasi-hierarchy to network relationships between supermarkets and importers.
This system addresses some of the problems of opportunism evident in the 1990s. The supermarkets will have a greater commitment to fewer suppliers. Prices should be fixed more on the basis of examination of costs and profit margins rather than conflictual bargaining, and the supermarkets are talking in terms of guaranteeing a viable rate of return on sales to their suppliers. The broader interface between supermarket and category manager should improve co-ordination along the chain. Nevertheless, it is far from clear how the new system will work, particularly when pressures on margins in the industry remain strong.
Further along the chain, the impact of category management will be less direct.
Irrespective of the introduction of category management, producers and exporters will still be needed to grow and process crops. However, changes will occur. Firstly, there are already signs of increasing volatility in the relationships between exporters and importers. Exporters do not want to be tied to the weaker category importers that may be excluded from the chain. but also diversifying their production bases, investing in, or managing, production capability in other countries. In some cases, this enables them to provide a more diversified growing capability for the UK importers, and hence a broader portfolio of products. In others, it is combined with forward integration into importing businesses, which in order to survive in the UK market must source a broad range of produce from various different countries. This means creating integrated, transnational production, a processing and importing businesses similar in some respects to firms such as Delmonte.
It is too early to say how category management will eventually change the fresh produce value chain. Even the supermarkets are not sure how it will develop. The tensions between co-ordination and economies of scale (favouring consolidation), on one hand, and maintaining competition to generate innovation and cost reductions on the other, have yet to be played out.
While category management may create a more effective interface between the retailer and the category manager, the relationship between the category manager and the rest of the supply chain will still have to deal with the problems of opportunism and incentives.
At the present time, 2001, the shift to category management is making linkages within the value chain more exclusive (fewer importers and fewer exporters supplying particular product lines to each supermarket) and strengthening the linkages between UK importers and UK supermarkets. However, in the longer term, more substantial changes in the value chain may result from category management. Firstly, the category managers may become a new, specialist link in value chain, managing importers on behalf of the supermarkets, but not themselves playing the importer role. In this scenario, the provision of specialist services around marketing and logistics is separated out from relationships with developing country producers and exporters. This would provide the problem of how one category manager deals with both its own supply chain and other UK importers. Secondly, the process of outsourcing of supply chain management functions in the fresh vegetables sector by UK supermarkets could be taken one step further. The category managers could take on even more responsibility, becoming independent "stores within stores", acting as franchisees within the supermarkets. This scenario is most likely if fresh produce ceases to be a "destination This last development would be reinforced by the introduction of credible certification systems that could be relied upon to deliver the quality, labour and environmental standards required in the value chain. Already, product attributes such as "fairtrade" and "organic" are delivered by broad-based standards independent of any particular supermarket. External standards such as Eurepgap and SA8000 will further extend this process. This would allow a further loosening of linkages in the value chain, while maintaining confidence in the attributes of products available in the UK supermarkets. The process of increasing monitoring and control and the development of intensive interaction between agents along the chain seen in the past 20 years is by no means irreversible.
Conclusions
The way in which supplies of fresh vegetables for the UK market are grown and processed in Kenya and distributed to UK supermarkets has changed beyond all recognition in the past 20 years. In this paper, global value chain analysis has been used to explain the changes in the industry, and why a distribution system originally based on spot markets has been replaced by tightly-integrated supply chains. Value chain analysis allowed an exploration of the consequences of these changes on the structure of the value chain, the distribution of functions within it, and the inclusion and exclusion of different agents in the chain. The concept of parameter setting highlighted not only how key decisions are made in the chain, but also how some parameter setting and enforcement might be removed from inter-firm relationships altogether by the development of sectoral and generic standards.
The driving force behind the restructuring of the value chain has been the rise to dominance of a small number of supermarkets in UK food retailing. It has been shown that UK supermarkets exercise a decisive influence over all stages of the value chain, from the way crops are grown (and the processes of innovation that lead to the introduction of new crops and varieties) to their processing and storage, despite the fact that they do not take ownership of produce until it is delivered to their regional distribution centres. Supermarket requirements for increased processing of products and product differentiation, combined with 27 increasing external pressure to meet food safety, environmental and labour standards has led to a radical restructuring of the fresh vegetables business. However, the process of restructuring will not end. Current tendencies indicate ways in which market relationships might be reintroduced into the chain without sacrificing assurances about process controls.
The introduction of category management and the imposition of external standards may reverse the current tendency for supermarkets to exercise ever-closer monitoring and control.
ENDNOTES

1
The term "explicit co-ordination" is taken from Clemons et al. (1993 A value chain refers to all the activities involved in making a product and taking it through to the consumer.
The term "supply chain" is used in this paper to refer to the firms involved in providing the material inputs into a particular point in the value chain. This distinction is discussed in Sturgeon (2001). 4 The role of product grading in reducing the cost suppliers of acquiring information about products is discussed by Foss (1996).
5
Eurep is the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group, consisting of large European food and flower retailers, and suppliers of fresh food. The term gap stands for good agricultural practice.
6
This explicit inter-firm co-ordination activity is termed "governance" in the global value chain literature.
7
For a discussion of company standards and how they are developed, see Nadvi and Wältring (2001). 10 Data from Eurostat, referring to product categories HS 0708 (peas and beans) and HS 0709 (other vegetables, including artichokes, asparagus, mushrooms, sweet peppers, capsicum, etc.). Throughout the 1990s, Kenya accounted for more than half of EU imports of these products from sub-Saharan Africa.
11 For source and definitions, see the previous note.
12 For example, Doel (1996) describes how Marks & Spencer created the chilled, ready meals sector in the UK, creating not only a new product segment, but also a whole new supply industry. Similarly, Hughes (2000) describes how UK supermarkets use designers and consumer magazines to shape consumer preferences for flowers. Various knowledge networks are mobilised by supermarkets to create demand and satisfy it. 
